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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines a number of problematic areas in which the
antitrust and intellectual property laws fail, or have failed, to attain the
efficiency and welfare goals that underlie them. Although some of the
areas in question have been separately analyzed in the literature, this
Article focuses on them as a unitary group: one whose existence presents
* Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The Author
gratefully acknowledges helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article by his colleagues:
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a challenge to the antitrust and intellectual property laws to develop a
common approach by explicitly recognizing the maximization of
aggregate social welfare as the goal of both sets of laws. This
recognition would help courts resolve apparent conflicts in the
applications of these laws, would probably produce better overall
decisional results, and would increase overall predictability. It would
also help the public to better understand the roles of these laws, and the
significance of the legal issues underlying their applications.
Although the antitrust revolution of the late 1970s sought to adopt
efficiency as the sole goal of the antitrust laws, that revolution was
thwarted by residual legal doctrines that have taken years to refashion.'
Moreover, it is unclear that efficiency has in fact triumphed or whether it
has been replaced by the goal of maximizing consumer welfare, a
different goal that generates tension with the avowed efficiency goals of
antitrust.2 Antitrust doctrine appears to have adjusted to meet the needs
of dynamically competitive industries, but it remains unclear whether an
expansion of the intellectual property laws is required for those
industries. Intellectual property laws are designed to foster innovation,
but their goals have been impeded by the patent misuse doctrines and an
excessive reliance on property theory.3 This Article considers the extent
to which our existing set of laws and legal doctrines require modification
in the interest of furthering social welfare.
First, in Part II, this Article discusses the patent system and price
discrimination. It argues that, consonant with the improvement of social
welfare underlying the patent system and the efficiency goals of the
antitrust laws, the policy goals of the patent system require the system
permit price discrimination where possible. That system is built upon
exclusive rights which provide the incentive to invent but also generate
allocative inefficiencies. But the allocative inefficiencies can be reduced
when the patentee is permitted to discriminate. In Part III, this Article
addresses the relation of intellectual property laws to antitrust laws in
dynamically competitive industries. To what extent should the law favor
private networks as opposed to industry-shared networks? Does the
1. See Sedona Conference Working Grp. on the Role of Econ. in Antitrust Law, The Sedona
Conference Commentary on the Role of Economics in Antitrust Law, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 69, 77-78
(2006) [hereinafter Sedona Conference Commentary] (describing the movement towards an
economics approach in antitrust law and the remaining impediments towards attainment of that
goal).
2. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 90-91
(1978).
3. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics oflimprovement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 996-99 (1997); see Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475,
487 (2011); Emir Aly Crowne, The Utilitarian Fruits Approach to Justifying Patentable Subject
Matter, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 753, 756-57, 756 n.9 (2011).
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answer involve a choice between fostering dynamic efficiency and static
efficiency? In Part IV, this Article addresses the Williamson tradeoff.
The conventional understanding of the tradeoff is that its use depends on
a resolution of the conflict between an efficiency approach to the
antitrust laws and a wealth-transfer approach. This Article raises the
question of whether this issue could be avoided by the imposition of a
tax or other monetary penalty on mergers that would meet the conditions
of the Williamson tradeoff. In Part V, this Article addresses social
welfare broadly conceived as extending beyond pure economic
enrichment, to embrace areas where the market fails to provide accurate
guidance. Social welfare calculated in this way includes areas affected
by market externalities, such as the environment and those raising
collective-action problems, like fishing regulation. This Article,
however, focuses narrowly on the pharmaceutical industry, noting (1)
the successes of the patent system to generate new pharmaceutical
products, (2) its failures to make these drugs widely available to the poor
of the developing world, and (3) the imposition of a larger share of that
industry's development costs on the American public than a global
welfare standard might indicate. In this part of the analysis, this Article
uses a global (rather than a national) conception of welfare and makes
the assumption that certain noneconomic values, such as extending
access to important life-saving drugs to the world's poor, would be
widely accepted as embraced within that broad conception.
II. PATENT LAW AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A. The Patent System's Tradeoff Between Innovation and
Market Power
As the conventional wisdom has it, the patent system incorporates a
tradeoff between innovation and market power.4 The exclusive rights
which the patent system bestows on the inventor create market power in
the inventor, which, in turn provides him with the incentive to devote his
skills and resources to invention. 5 The public benefits from the
availability of the invention immediately (albeit on terms consonant with
the inventor's exclusive rights), and, upon the expiration of the patent
term, gets the further benefit of the invention's availability on
4. Richard S. Vermut, A Synthesis of the Intellectual Property and Antitrust Laws: A Look at
Refusals to License Computer Software, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 27, 28-29 (1997); see also
Lemley, supra note 3, at 993-94, 996-99 (discussing the tension between incentives to invent and
encouraging competition in the market).
5. Lemley, supra note 3, at 994, 1000-02.
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competitive-market terms: price and output at marginal cost, at least in
theory.6
This conventional wisdom, however, obscures as well as describes.
Let's examine the operation of the patent system in more detail. First,
only some patents generate market power in any significant sense. These
are patents on major technological advances or new products for which
there are no satisfactory substitutes. In Westinghouse v. Boyden Power
Brake Co.,8 the U.S. Supreme Court described a pioneer invention as a
major technological advance. 9 The economics literature similarly
distinguishes between major and minor inventions.10 Major inventions
are those that reduce cost drastically, resulting in a price below the
previous production cost." Major inventions then are unconstrained by
competition from substitutes.12 Minor inventions, by contrast, involve
technology that provide modest cost-savings in the use of existing
production techniques.
A patent on a minor invention normally does not engender market
power in a legal sense and little power in an economic sense (as
measured by the Lerner index).14 This kind of patent generally involves
an improvement in the technology used to produce an end product,
reducing costs." An economically rational patentee holding rights over
such a minor invention would charge producers a royalty that was just
6. See Bohannan, supra note 3, at 516-17; Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and
Costs of the Patent System Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 81-82 (2004).
7. See Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898) (noting that
a patent on a .'pioneer' invention was extremely valuable to the public); Gifford, supra note 6, at
83-84.
8. 170 U.S. 537 (1898).
9. Id. at 561-62 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Westinghouse, the Court provided this
description of a "'pioneer... invention:
This word [pioneer], although used somewhat loosely, is commonly understood to
denote a patent covering a function never before performed, a wholly novel device, or
one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art, as
distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of what had gone before. Most
conspicuous examples of such patents are: The one to Howe of the sewing machine; to
Morse, of the electrical telegraph; and to Bell, of the telephone.
Id.
10. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTtvITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609,621-22
(1962); W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 868-71 (4th ed.
2005); see also Gifford, supra note 6, at 94-97 (discussing the Arrow analysis if dividing inventions
into two categories).
11. VISCUSIETAL.,supra note 10, at 870-71.
12. See id. at 870-71.
13. See id. at 868 n.8, 870; Gifford, supra note 6, at 84.
14. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 10, at 294-95, 870 (noting that the market price is
unaffected for minor inventions).
15. See id. at 868-70, 868 n.7; Gifford, supra note 6, at 84-85.
[Vol. 40:437
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slightly less than the cost savings that the new technology made
possible.' 6 In this way, such a patentee can capture the entire cost saving
that his invention makes available at the pre-existing level of output for
the end product.' 7 But in the output of the end product nothing changes.
Measured by that pre-existing output level, there is no deadweight loss
and no effect on market prices. 18 Moreover, the patentee's exercise of his
rights over the improved technology are constrained by the continued
availability of the older technology.' 9
From the viewpoint of the higher level of technology that
incorporates the invention, however, there is a deadweight loss: it
consists of the difference between the current price and output levels,
and the levels that the newly invented technology would make possible
in the absence of the inventor's license fees.20 Another way of saying
this is that, from this perspective, the patentee possesses a limited market
power, limited by actual or potential competition from the pre-existing
technology. In the case of a typical patent on a minor invention, this
deadweight loss is small compared to the production-cost savings that it
brings about.2' In Figure 1, the deadweight loss from the minor invention
that reduces cost from C, to C2, the deadweight loss is the area
represented by the triangle ABD, which is small in comparison to the
cost savings that it brings about represented by the rectangle CIADC2. In
the case of a major invention, the dynamics are different. A patentee that
must charge a single uniform price to all of its customers will charge the
optimum monopoly price; to do this, it must restrict production, thus
generating a deadweight loss. 22 That deadweight loss will be significant
in relation to the patentee's royalties.23 In the case of linear demand, the
deadweight loss would be equal to one-half of the royalties.24
16. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 10, at 868-70; Gifford, supra note 6, at 95-97, 96 n.5.
17. See Arrow, supra note 10, at 620; Gifford, supra note 6, at 95-96.
18. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 10, at 870 ("For minor inventions, market price is
unaffected."); Gifford, supra note 6, at I11.
19. Gifford, supra note 6, at 96-97, 96 n.95.
20. See id. at 82, 85 & n.44.
21. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 10, at 869 fig.24.1, 870 (illustrating the relationship
between the price and quantity of the invention versus its production cost); Gifford, supra note 6, at
95-97.
22. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 347-48 (5th ed.
2001) (defining deadweight loss in relation to monopolies); VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 10, at 83 &
fig.4.2, 870-71, 871 fig.24.2; Gifford, supra note 6, at 85, 97.
23. See Arrow, supra note 10, at 622; see also VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 10, at 868 & n.9,
870-71, 871 fig.24.2; Gifford, supra note 6, at 85, 94, 97 (noting that pioneer inventions are likely to
generate high ratios of deadweight loss compared to improvement inventions).
24. See Gifford, supra note 6, at 110.
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Prior to the invention, the industry operated on an aggregate
marginal cost curve represented by C1. The invention lowered the
production cost curve to C2. The patentee would charge a royalty
just slightly below the difference between C, and C2. From the
viewpoint of the pre-existing technology, nothing has changed.
Output remains at Q1. From the viewpoint of the higher level of
technology brought about by this (minor) invention, there is a
deadweight loss represented by the area in the triangle above C2
and to the right of Q, or the area of the triangle ABD. That
deadweight loss is small in relation to the cost savings that it made
possible, which is the entire area between C, and C2 to the Q,
output level or the area of the rectangle CIADC2. Figure 1 also
depicts a major invention that brings cost down to C3. Because of
the absence of alternatives for the major invention, the patentee
charges a monopoly price for its use. The deadweight loss
generated by this invention is represented by the triangle CFG.
The following discussion is directed to major inventions. Those
best fit the model in the popular description because they generate
monopoly power and a significant deadweight loss. 2 5 Figure I shows a
major invention that reduces Cost to C3 and (at the new level of
technology that the invention brings about) generates a deadweight loss.
626
This deadweight loss results from the mechanics of the patent system.
It is the pricet o the pe sfog te advance in technology brought
about by the patented invention. Yet in some circumstances, some of that
25. See VISCUSIET AL., supra note 10, at 870-7; Gifford, supra note 6, at 85, 97.
26. Gifford, supra note 6, at 85.
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deadweight loss may be avoidable. If the patentee can discriminate in
price, then he may be able to maximize his profits by replicating (to the
extent feasible) the behavior of a perfectly discriminating monopolist. A
well-known example of this behavior is the method employed by the
IBM Corporation ("IBM") during the 1930s in marketing its early
computers.27 That company offered to lease 28 its machines at relatively
low prices (which presumably reflected marginal cost), while requiring
users to obtain computer cards from the company. 29 The company made
its profit from the sale of the computer cards which it sold at prices
substantially over marginal cost.30 Since intense users would buy more
cards and less intensive users would buy fewer, the sale of cards would
track the value that each user would place on the machine.3' Thus, IBM,
by tying the cards to the machines, was able to extract from each
purchaser an amount that approximated that purchaser's reservation
price.32 Let's explore the legal constraints surrounding such behavior.
B. Section 271 of the Patent Act
1. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.33 and the
Patent Misuse Doctrine
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Independent Ink, Inc.
discarding the presumption that a patent necessarily produced market
power.34 In so deciding, the Court eliminated a presumption that lacked
an empirical base. 35 After all, most patents do not create market power in
any meaningful sense.36 That decision thus took its place in a series of
recent antitrust decisions rationalizing antitrust law by bringing its
27. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 132-33 (1936).
28. Leasing (rather than selling) the machines was an important part of IBM's pricing strategy
because leasing prevented arbitrage. See id. at 134. If the machines had been sold at discriminatory
prices, purchasers in the lower-priced market would profit by reselling them in the higher-priced
market. See id. at 139 (noting that absent the provisions of IBM's lease, competitors would produce
an equal or better quality product offered at the same or lower price).
29. Id. at 134; Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond
Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1871, 1891 (2003).
30. SeelBM, 298 U.S. at 136.
31. See Keith K. Wollenberg, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-examining the
Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737, 751 & n.93 (1987); see also Meurer, supra note 29, at
1891 (noting that punch card purchases measured frequency of use).
32. See Wollenberg, supra note 31, at 751 & n.93 (noting that tying allowed IBM to identify
its heaviest users and charge those users a higher price as they valued the machine more).
33. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
34. See id. at 42-46.
35. Id. at 42-45.
36. Id. at 44.
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content more in line with its purported goals of efficiency and the
maximization of (consumer or aggregate) welfare.37
In deciding that case, the Court relied in part on the history of the
patent misuse doctrine. 38 That doctrine originated in the courts, which
had incorporated into patent law the public policy that they had found in
the Clayton Act's provisions targeting tying arrangements. 39 Although
the patent misuse doctrine ultimately grew to encompass other attempts
to extend patent power beyond its statutory boundaries, 40 the core of the
doctrine was centered on the use of patents as tying products.4' Applying
the misuse doctrine, the courts would refuse to enforce patents during
periods in which a patentee was using his patent as a tying product in a
tying arrangement. When the judicial decisions applying the misuse
doctrine broadened its scope to undermine the traditional understanding
of contributory infringement,43 Congress stepped in to reinforce
contributory infringement and limit patent misuse.
In 1952, Congress spelled out what would, and would not,
constitute contributory infringement and patent misuse in Section 271 of
the Patent Act. 44 Behavior that would constitute infringement if
performed by another without the patentee's consent would not
constitute misuse, if performed by the patentee.45 In its 1988 amendment,
Congress further limited misuse by allowing a patentee to tie staples to
its patent, so long as the patentee lacked market power.46 In Independent
37. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889-92
(2007); Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. at 45; Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S.
1, 19-21 (1979).
38. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. at 38.
39. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 509-11 (1917)
(describing how the Court established the patent misuse doctrine); see also Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
at 37-38 (noting that the patent misuse doctrine originated in Motion Picture Patents Co.).
40. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30-33 (1964) (condemning use of patents to extend
royalty payments beyond the patent's term).
41. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1942); Motion Picture
Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 509, 517.
42. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969) ("There is
nothing in the right granted the patentee to keep others from using, selling, or manufacturing his
invention which empowers him to insist on payment not only for use but also for producing
products which do not employ his discoveries at all.").
43. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 668-69 (1944) ("The result
of this decision, together with those which have preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of
contributory infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to consider.").
44. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
45. See id. § 271(d), 66 Stat. at 811.
46. Patent Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5)); see also Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust
Reform: "BlessedBe The Tie?, " HARV. J.L. & TECH., Spring 1991, at 1, 5-8.
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Ink, Inc., the Court relied on this provision as showing that, in enacting
Section 271, Congress intended to make the presence (or absence) of
market power a matter of proof; market power (for purposes of the
patent misuse doctrine) could not be presumed from the mere existence
of a patent.47
Independent Ink, Inc. carries over the congressional approach to
market power for purposes of the patent misuse doctrine into antitrust
law.48 This is an eminently reasonable approach, as the patent misuse
doctrine is designed to incorporate antitrust concerns in patent law.49 If
Congress believes that a patentee is not behaving anti-competitively
when it ties a specially made component to a patented product, that
determination ought to govern antitrust law as well, since the same
policy concerns are involved.5 ° But from the perspective of an ideal
relationship between intellectual property law and antitrust law, the
premises of Section 271 need to be reconsidered and drastically revised.
Section 271 permits a patent owner to tie to the patented product a
component of the patented invention; it also permits a patentee to tie
staple articles of commerce to the patented product so long as the patent
owner lacks market power in the relevant market.5' Let's examine these
provisions. Section 271(c) is designed to confirm the Supreme Court's
decision in Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (Leeds &
Catlin Co. I/),52 and reject its decision in the Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Investment Co.53 and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co.54 cases (collectively the "Mercoid cases"). In
Leeds & Catlin Co. II, the Court upheld the rights of the patentee of the
phonograph to capture the market for phonograph records.55 In the
Mercoid cases, the Court disallowed a patentee of a heating system to
capture the market for thermostats especially designed for the patented
47. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42-43 (2006).
48. See id. at 42.
49. Seeid. at31.
50. Scholars debate the extent to which the misuse doctrine should be concerned with policy
issues beyond antitrust. Compare Boharman, supra note 3, at 486, with Thomas F. Cotter, Four
Questionable Rationales for the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 12 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 457, 474-75
(2011). Under the current rulings of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, the
misuse doctrine applies when a patentee leverages its patent to extend its control beyond the powers
conferred in its patent grant and when doing so produces an anticompetitive effect. See Princo Corp.
v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc.,
782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The requirement of an anticompetitive effect ensures that
misuse policy is consistent with antitrust policy. See Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1351.
51. See35U.S.C.§271.
52. 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
53. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
54. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
55. Leeds & Catlin Co. II, 213 U.S. at 335, 337.
20111
heating system.56 The initial version of Section 271 was also designed to
confirm the Court's decision in Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
Development Corp.,7 where the patentee of a refrigeration package was
not permitted to tie the sale of dry ice to a license for the refrigeration
package. 58
Let's examine the situations in which these decisions would apply.
Leeds & Catlin Co. II represents the situation in which the patented
machine embraces a particular component and in which the owner of the
machine expects to purchase an indefinite number of similar (and almost
physically identical) components.59 In this situation, there are two
markets: a market for the machine (the phonograph) and a market for the
components (the records).60 In the language of economists, tying here
involves variable proportions between the tying and tied products. 6 1 The
Mercoid cases represent the situation in which there is only one
market.62 Purchasers want the heating system and obtain it by purchasing
a component (the thermostat) and thereby receive a license to construct
the system.63 Carbice Corp. represents the case in which the patentee
finds it convenient to earn its profit through the sale of staple articles. 6
In 1952, Congress legislatively provided that a patentee would not
65be guilty of misuse by selling a component of a patented device.
56. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. at 662, 667-69; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
320 U.S. at 682, 684.
57. 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
58. See id. at 30-31, 33-34.
59. Leeds & Catlin Co. 11, 213 U.S. at 332.
60. See id. at 330-31.
61. See Bohannan, supra note 3, at 493, 502.
62. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 682-83 (1944).
63. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. at 663-64; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320
U.S. at 682-83.
64. See Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 29-30, 33-34 (1931).
65. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). The relevant provisions of the 1952 legislation are
paragraphs (c) and (d) of Section 27 1:
(c) whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfiinging use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following:
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to
perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
446 HOFS TRA LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 40:437
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Largely ignoring economic distinctions, the legislation incorporated a
doctrinal distinction, drawn from prior decisional law, which turned on
whether the component was a staple article suitable for other uses or was
specially made for the patented invention.66 Under the 1952 version of
Section 271, the Carbice Corporation's sale of dry ice was not
contributory infringement because dry ice is a staple article.67 Under the
structure of the legislation, the patentee's tie-in sale of that staple was
not exempted from misuse.68 Under the prevailing misuse doctrine, tying
was the major form of misuse. Thus, as of 1952, Congress reaffirmed
Carbice Corp.
When Congress revisited this provision in 1988, it added
subsections 4 and 5 to paragraph (d).69 Clause 5 specifically addresses
the Carbice Corp. situation.7 ° Section 271, as revised in 1988, permits a
patentee to tie other products to the patent, so long as the patentee lacks
market power in the relevant market. 7' The "ties" permitted under the
1952 version reflected the patent's scope: the records and the thermostat
were components of the patented invention-in asserting exclusive
rights over the components, the patentee was grounding itself on its
exclusive right to "make" the patented invention.72 Since these
components had no use other than in constructing the invention, any
person who used those components to construct the invention without
the permission of the patentee was engaged in direct infringement and
the person who supplied those parts to the direct infringer was engaged
in contributory infringement. The ties permitted under the 1988
amendment broadened the power of patentees to tie staples, extending
their power to "tie" beyond specially made components.73
The 1988 revision reflected the growing consensus that ties were
not inherently anticompetitive.74 That legislation was also roughly
infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or
contributory infringement.
Id.
66. See id. § 271(c).
67. See id.; Carbice Corp., 283 U.S. at 29-30, 34-35; see also Burchfiel, supra note 46, at 15,
20-21 (discussing patent misuse regarding ties to staples).
68. See Carbice Corp., 283 U.S. at 33-34; Burchfiel, supra note 46, at 20-21.
69. Patent Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (2006)).
70. See id. (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5)); Carbice Corp., 283 U.S. at 33-34;
Burchfiel, supra note 46, at 20-21.
71. Patent Act of 1988 § 201, 102 Stat. at 4676.
72. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661,
663-64 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 682-83
(1944); Leeds & Catlin Co. 11, 213 U.S. 325, 330, 335, 337 (1909).
73. Patent Act of 1988 § 201, 102 Stat. at 4676.
74. See Burchfiel, supra note 46, at 23-24. The 1988 legislation added subsections (4) and (5)
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contemporaneous with the Supreme Court's decision in Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.75 In Jefferson Parish Hospital District
No. 2, the Court significantly relaxed the antitrust treatment of tying
arrangements.76 There, the Court strengthened the market power
requirement for per se condemnation of ties77 and a four Justice
concurrence proposed abolishing the per se rule entirely.78 Under the
1988 version of Section 271, the only ties that could be treated as misuse
were those of staples imposed by a patentee that possessed market
power.79 Market power thus was the critical element for both patent
misuse and per se antitrust treatment.
2. A Tentative Economic Evaluation of Section 271
a. The Economics of Section 271
Section 271's disapproval of the Mercoid cases carried a number of
economic consequences. First, it meant that Congress decided to allow a
patentee freedom in collecting revenue from its patent in circumstances
that are described by the single-monopoly-profit theorem. 80 That
to paragraph (d) which provided:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following:
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to
perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or
contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5)
conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on
the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
Patent Act of 1988 § 201, 102 Stat. at 4676 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)).
75. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
76. Id. at 16-18, 29, 31-32; see Burchfiel, supra note 46, at 50-51.
77. See Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2, 466 U.S. at 15-18.
78. Id. at 32, 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79. Patent Act of 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 271); see
Burchfiel, supra note 46, at 5-10.
80. See David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 77-78 (2005). As Evans and
Padilla have explained:
Economic theory shows that, under some assumptions, in a vertical chain of
production, there is fixed potential for monopoly profit. A firm with a monopoly at one
level of the chain gets all of the monopoly profit if it charges a monopoly price and
everyone else in the chain charges a competitive price. Indeed, it serves the monopolist
to encourage competition at every other level because any monopoly profit earned by
others will reduce its own. Variants of the single-monopoly-profit theorem have been
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theorem applied to the transactions in the Mercoid cases as the tie
involved a fixed one-on-one ratio between the patent license and the
thermostat. Second, Section 271's approval of Leeds & Catlin Co. 11
meant that Congress also decided to allow a patentee to engage in some
variable-proportion ties when they involved specially made
components.8' Thus in Leeds & Catlin Co. 11, users of the patented
phonograph were required to obtain their records from the patentee.1
2
Section 271 accordingly authorized the use of specially made
components such as metering devices when practicable, thus enabling a
patentee to discriminate between high- and low-intensity users.83 The
congressional approval in 1952 and its subsequent disapproval in 1988
of Carbice Corp. means that Congress, after first objecting to the
practice, now has recognized the legitimacy of a patentee without market
power engaging in price discrimination between high- and low-intensity
users involving staples.84 This is not surprising, since sellers of
unpatented goods lacking market power can similarly use ties to
discriminate in this way.85 Indeed, the marketplace offers many
examples of manufacturers that sell their goods at low prices and earn
their profits from the sale of staples, albeit staples that are specially
crafted to physically interconnect with the primary good.86
(Manufacturers of computer printers, for example, commonly construct
them so that users will have to obtain replacement ink cartridges from
the manufacturer, who earns additional profit from a mark-up of the
cartridges. The arrangement thus works as a rough metering device,
charging intensive users more than occasional users.)87
applied to tying, essential facilities, and, more broadly, to the analysis of vertical
integration.
Id. at 77 (footnote omitted).
81. See Leeds & Catlin Co. 11, 213 U.S. 325, 332-33, 335, 337 (1909) (describing the various
elements and combinations between patented and unpatented elements); see also Burchfiel, supra
note 46, at 69-73 (distinguishing between variable proportion ties that "merely maximize profit" and
those that "unlawfully extend monopoly power").
82. Leeds & Catlin Co. 11, 213 U.S. at 330-33.
83. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006); Meurer, supra note 29, at 1889 (noting that
sellers discriminate prices based upon buyers' frequency of using a certain product); Wollenberg,
supra note 31, at 743, 750-51 ("By selling the monopolized good only in combination with another
good that meters how intensely the consumer uses the monopolized good, the monopolist effectively
price discriminates." (footnote omitted)).
84. Compare Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (excluding
subsections (4) and (5) of paragraph (d)), with Patent Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102
Stat. 4674, 4676 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5)) (establishing subsections (4) and
(5)). See Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31-33 (1931); Bohannan, supra
note 3, at 492-94, 494 n.77.
85. See Bohannan, supra note 3, at 501-02, 504-05; Wollenberg, supra note 31, at 744, 753.
86. See Bohannan, supra note 3, at 501-04; Wollenberg, supra note 31, at 747-48, 747 n.81.
87. See Boharnan, supra note 3, at 502; Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the
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What requires explanation, however, is why patentees with market
power are treated as misusing their patents when they institute ties
involving staple articles. Ties here could be used as metering devices,
much as IBM tied punch cards to its computers.88 As many
commentators have pointed out, when IBM tied the cards to its
machines, it probably was attempting to replicate (as far as possible) the
behavior of a "perfectly discriminating monopolist. ' '89 It would therefore
capture increased consumer surplus, but it would also increase its
computer output to a level approximating the intersection of its marginal
cost curve with demand: a perfectly discriminating monopolist produces
the competitive output and generates no deadweight loss.90
Of course, the misuse rules governing patentees with market power
are the same as the per se rules governing ties in general. 91 Any supplier
with market power that employs tying arrangements runs afoul of the per
se rule.92 In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor argued in her concurrence that the time had come to abolish
the per se rule.93 This Article contends that although Justice O'Connor's
arguments are persuasive, there is more reason to allow a patentee with
market power to engage in tying than non-patentees because the policy
behind patent law is focused on encouraging innovation. The availability
of tying as a marketing mechanism carries the potential for increasing
the patentee's economic rewards, as well as creating the potential for
reducing the resource misallocation that is an accepted part of the patent
system's way of fostering invention.
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 432-33 (2009).
88. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134, 136 (1936); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright
Law andPrice Discrimination, 23 CARDoZO L. REV. 55, 121-22 (2001).
89. See Meurer, supra note 88, at 121-22; Sedona Conference Commentary, supra note 1, at
80.
90. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697, 702-03, 703 n.19 (1975); Daniel J. Gifford,
The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An Emerging Solution to An Intractable Problem, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 382-83 (2002) (discussing how monopolists capture all of the consumer
surplus as a result of perfect price discrimination); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:
A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1833 n.50 (1984) (describing how perfect price
discrimination generates no deadweight loss); Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price
Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 327-28 (2002) (noting that under perfect price
discrimination, the marginal revenue curve equals the demand curve); Meurer, supra note 88, at 90-
91, 98-99.
91. See Bohannan, supra note 3, at 487 & n.47; Cotter, supra note 50, at 460-62, 461 n.17.
92. See Sedona Conference Commentary, supra note 1, at 79-80.
93. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 35 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The time has therefore come to abandon the 'per se' label and refocus the inquiry on
the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have.").
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b. The Case of the Perfectly Discriminating Monopolist
Section 271 allows patentees to tie specially made components to a
patented invention.9a Where the components are used in variable
proportions with the invention, a tie of the components carries the
potential for the type of price discrimination that resembles those
employed by IBM: selling to each buyer at his reservation price and thus
replicating the behavior of a perfectly discriminating monopolist. 95
Perfect price discrimination, in this circumstance, enables the patentee to
capture the entire value of the invention and eliminates the deadweight
lOSS. 9 6 Of course, perfect price discrimination is a theoretical ideal that
can only be approximated in the real world. IBM approximated that
ideal-it did not achieve it. But it was able to allow the inventor to
capture most (rather than all) of the value of its invention while
producing computers at an output level that approximated the
competitive one.
97
In the IBM case, IBM was not allowed to tie the computer cards to
the lease of its machines.98 The result was that output moved from a
competitive level to the single-price monopoly level, with a concomitant
loss of allocative efficiency marked by a large deadweight loss.99 Thus,
IBM changed from replicating the behavior of a perfectly discriminating
monopolist to replicating the behavior of a single-price monopolist.'00
94. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
95. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134-36 (1936); Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust's
Troubled Relations with Intellectual Property, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1695, 1703-04 (2003); Sedona
Conference Commentary, supra note 1, at 80.
96. Kaplow, supra note 90, at 1833 n.50 ("If perfect price discrimination were possible, there
would be no deadweight loss from the patent system .... "); Klock, supra note 90, at 327-28.
97. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 135-36, 139; Gifford, supra note 95, at 1703-04; Meurer, supra note
88, at 122.
98. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 139-40. The government and the Court thought that the arrangement
violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act as tending to create a monopoly. Id at 132, 134-35, 140. It is
not clear where the monopoly would be-IBM already had a monopoly on electronic computers. Id
at 133, 136. The tying arrangement did not reduce competition from the mechanical computers
produced by Remington Rand, Inc. Id. at 136. Perhaps the government and the Court thought that
IBM was trying to obtain a monopoly in the tabulating cards themselves.
99. Gifford, supra note 95, at 1703-04; infra fig.2 and accompanying text.
100. Gifford, supra note 95, at 1703-04; infra fig.2 and accompanying text.
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IBM had originally attempted to set the price for each user at that
user's reservation price. Its objective was to capture as profits the
area composed of A, B, and C. Under its original approach, its
computer output would extend to Q1. It was forced by the Court to
set a single price for its product. In that case, its output would fall
to Q2 and it would charge a single price, identified here as P2. Its
profits would be confined to the area A. Area B would then
represent consumer surplus. Area C represents a social loss:
buyers who were willing to pay more than the costs of providing
the machines would be unable to acquire them. The Court's ruling
resulted in bestowing consumer surplus on customers paying the
monopoly price, but at the cost to society of the waste represented
by area C. Restated, the Court's decree produced a distributional
transfer of benefits from the producer to consumers, but at the
cost of social waste.
The lesson that should be drawn from the IBM experience is that
tying (in variable proportions) can facilitate a patentee using price
discrimination to eliminate the deadweight loss that is associated with
the way the patent system fosters invention. Of course, this route will
also eliminate the consumer surplus that would be generated by a
patentee following the single-price monopolist pattern, but on balance
and as explained in more detail below, this use of price discrimination
seems most consonant with the combined objectives of the antitrust and
patent laws.
As Section 271 is written, it allows a patentee to tie specially made
components and thus try to replicate the behavior of a perfectly
discriminating monopolist, but it does not allow a patentee with market
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power to tie staple articles.' 0 ' When IBM tied computer cards to its
computers, the issue arose as to whether the cards were part of the
patented device.10 2 The Court decided this issue against IBM, ruling that
the cards were constituent parts of the device only in their punched
version. 0 3 The Court therefore ruled that the un-punched cards were not
covered by the patent'°4-in today's discourse this would be tantamount
to ruling that the un-punched cards were staple articles. But how would
that issue be resolved under today's version of Section 271? Although
the cards were useful in IBM's electronic computer, they were probably
also useful in Remington Rand Inc.'s contemporary mechanical
computer as well. 10 5 Or if the shape of the cards used by the two
machines differed, a court might consider those differences insubstantial.
If so, then the cards would be staples and Section 271 would bar IBM
from tying cards to its computer.
106
In another more recent case, the Rohm and Haas Company ("Rohm
& Haas") was allowed to tie the sale of the chemical propanil to the use
of its patented herbicide process.10 7 Rohm & Haas's practice fit under
Section 271 because propanil was not a staple article, as it had no known
uses other than in conjunction with the patented process. 08 Suppose,
however, that another use was discovered for propanil. Then propanil
would become a staple. In such a case the ability of Rohm & Haas to
impose its tie would depend on whether it possessed market power. 10 9
Ideally, Section 271 should be written to allow tying by all
patentees, with no exception for patentees with market power. Such a
rewriting would reconceptualize Section 271, substituting a modem
economic approach for the doctrinal concepts in which it was originally
written. Section 271 distinguishes between products that are staples and
those that are patent components-a distinction drawn from patent
doctrine and traditional analyses of contributory infringement. "0 The
proposed revision of that section would draw from economic analyses of
tying arrangements and of price discrimination. The original version of
Section 271 was intended both to confirm traditional contributory
101. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see Burchfiel, supra note 46, at 5.
102. IBM, 298 U.S. at 136.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 133.
106. See 35 U.S.C. § 271; IBM, 298 U.S. at 133-34; Gifford, supra note 90, at 386.
107. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 179, 182-84, 223 (1980).
108. Id. at 184, 199.
109. See id. at 201-02 (noting that Rohm & Haas's behavior was protected in this instance).
110. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 271(c)-(d), 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271); Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64
VAND. L. REv. 675, 688 (2011).
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infringement doctrine and to bring patent misuse doctrine into line with
prevailing antitrust approaches to tying.1" Its later amendment was
intended to continue the correspondence between patent misuse and
antitrust approaches to tying-the amendment being necessary because
of changes in antitrust that had taken place in the years between the
Patent Act's enactment in 1952 and the amendment in 1988.112 The
proposal would replace the doctrinal underpinnings of that provision
with economic ones.
III. DYNAMIC COMPETITION: ANTITRUST AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
For most of the past decade and a half, antitrust scholars have
engaged in a vigorous debate about the proper role of antitrust and
intellectual property in knowledge-based industries that exhibit network
effects." 3 Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") is the paradigm example.
The pharmaceutical industry provides an enlightening counterpoint.
Shortly before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued
its decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Corp. Hf),114
David Evans and Richard Schmalensee wrote a paper arguing that for a
set of (knowledge-based) industries (identifiable by a convergence of
certain characteristics) the then-prevailing antitrust rules operated
perversely to impede innovation.l 5  According to Evans and
Schmalensee, the relevant industries displayed many or most of the
following characteristics (although none were essential): their products
are protected by intellectual property; they incur high fixed costs and
low marginal costs; they employ labor intensively while making less
intensive use of capital; they generate network effects; they are involved
in competition to create or replace an existing product through drastic
111. See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 521, 525, 535, 543-44 (1953).
112. Compare Patent Act of 1952 § 271, 66 Stat. at 811, with Patent Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271). See also Gifford,
supra note 90, at 385-87 (discussing the 1988 amendment to the Patent Act and how "the approach
of section 271 to misuse is largely consistent with section three's approach to antitrust evaluation").
113. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the
Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 538-39, 542-43, 543 n.17 (2001).
114. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Corp. 11), 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
115. See generally David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of
Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the economics of antitrust in a variety of
industries that are experiencing a significant change in technology). The Author of this Article has
discussed the Evans and Schmalensee article in a comparative law context. See generally Daniel J.
Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Antitrust Approaches to Dynamically Competitive Industries in the
United States and the European Union, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 695 (2011) (referring to the
innovation in technological industries discussed in the Evans and Schmalensee article).
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innovation (this often involves "winner-take-all races"); and industry
leaders reap substantial amounts (viewed ex post) of supra-competitive
profits. 116
Underlying their contentions was the idea that knowledge-based
industries follow a developmental pattern that resembles the path taken
by the pharmaceutical industry: pharmaceutical products are protected
by intellectual property (patents); pharmaceutical companies expend
substantial sums on initial product development; and compared to the
sums spent on research and development, pharmaceutical companies'
marginal costs on production are low (and benefit from scale economies
and learning curves). 1 7 Successful pharmaceutical products command
prices exceeding marginal costs. 1t 8 These companies often produce
products that dominate their markets and sometimes these companies
compete with rivals for dominance in the market in which their drug is
sold. l1 9
Although Evans and Schmalensee seem to have been inspired by
the pharmaceutical industry's development path, their paper sets forth a
model for knowledge-based industries that extends the pharmaceutical
model beyond that industry to embrace firms like Microsoft that market
computer operating systems and office software. 20 In the process of this
expansion, Evans and Schmalensee added network effects to the package
of characteristics identifying the knowledge-based industries that they
contended were being stymied by existing antitrust laws.1 21 With this
additional characteristic, their model fits Microsoft like a glove.
116. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 5, 8-13; Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at
699.
117. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 8 (noting that the pharmaceutical industry
spends relatively lower amounts on material expenses); Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 700-01
(discussing how industry giants primarily handle research and development and have the resources
to put the products on the market, as well as how the pharmaceutical industry exists in an
environment where patent law protects innovators).
118. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 6-7 tbl.l.2, 8, 14 (noting the expenses and
revenues of pharmaceuticals as a new-economy industry and discussing the general principle of high
rates of return when prices are higher than marginal cost).
119. Seeid.atl7.
120. See id. at 5, 9, 11; Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 708. Microsoft's Windows
operating system, and most of the products of Microsoft Office generate network effects. See Evans
& Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 9; Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 708. Network effects
add value to the product as the user base increases. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 9, 11.
Once these products had attained a large volume, network effects ensured that their volume would
continually increase. See id. at 11. Network effects thus explain why Microsoft's operating system
and Microsoft Office products dominate their respective fields. See id. at 9, 19 tbl.1.3 (graphing
Microsoft's ninety-four percent market share worldwide in personal computer operating systems).
121. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 2, 9 (describing network effects and stating
that unless small firms come up with a way to "defeat the natural advantage that network effects
bestow on the industry leaders," they have little hope of overtaking those leaders).
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The critical difference between Microsoft and the firms of the
pharmaceutical industry lies in the availability of patent protection to the
latter. Because the development path of the pharmaceutical firms
proceeds under the umbrella of patent protection, they are able to expend
substantial sums on research and development because they know that
successful product development can generate supra-competitive returns
which will cover these costs. 122 And the exclusive rights provided by the
patent system ensure that these supra-competitive revenues will not be
eroded away by competition from copycat rivals.123 A company like
Microsoft, by contrast, incurs similar upfront research and development
costs but lacks the protection that the patent law provides the
pharmaceutical companies.
12 4
Microsoft, despite its lack of patent protection, follows a similar
development path as pharmaceutical companies. It is able to do so
because its revenues are also protected from imitators, but through a
mechanism different from patent law.2 5 Of course, copyright protects
Microsoft's software products from identical copying by rivals but does
not bar rivals from copying the ideas embodied in those products as
patent law would. 126 Indeed, copyright is a form of intellectual property
designed for competition among differentiated products and it assumes
that any copyright-protected product will be subject to competition from
other similar (but not identical) products. 127 But the "combination of
copyright, trade secret law, and network effects" creates the protection
that Microsoft needs. 128
The software products produced and marketed by Microsoft
(operating systems and office products) generate network effects, that is,
their value to users increases as others also use the products. 129 Once
Microsoft attained a significant sales lead in such a product, network
effects helped ensure that its lead over its rivals would grow. 30 And the
two types of normally weak intellectual property protection provided by
copyright and trade secret law ensure that the network effects generated
122. See, e.g., id. at 5, 6-7 tbl.1.2 (listing "the leading industrial firms whose expenditures on
[research and development] accounted for more than 10% of their sales in 1997," of which
pharmaceutical firms accounted for three of the top four). "Firms in new-economy industries tend to
have high fixed costs and low marginal production costs. They often must invest a great deal to
develop their products... because they must make substantial investments in [research and
development] . I... Id. at 5.
123. See Gifford, supra note 6, at 81-82, 87.
124. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 701-02.
125. Id. at 707-09.
126. Id. at 707-08.
127. See id at 707.
128. Id. at 707-08.
129. Id. at 708; see Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 9.
130. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 6 tbl. 1.2, 9, 12.
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by its software products remain with those products."' Given network
effects, in order to overcome Microsoft's lead and compete on an even
level, rival products would have to compete in the same network. 132 To
compete in the same network, rival products would need to use the same
application program interfaces ("APIs") as the Microsoft products.'33
These APIs are not legally protected by copyright, but because copyright
protects the Microsoft products from simple copying (which would copy
the APIs as well as all the other aspects of the Microsoft programs), and
because Microsoft carefully guards the APIs as trade secrets, rivals who
want to compete in the same network are compelled to obtain the APIs
by reverse engineering. 34 This is a burdensome task and one that IBM
found too costly when it was attempting to compete with Windows in
the 1990s.13' Thus network effects-combined with the intellectual
property protection supplied by copyright and trade secret law-are
playing the role that patent protection plays for pharmaceuticals: they
protect the product from competition by imitators. This combination is in
effect a new and strong form of intellectual property protection. In so
protecting Microsoft's products, it enables that company to generate the
supra-competitive revenues that are necessary, inter alia, to cover its
research and development costs.
36
Evans and Schmalensee appreciate the role of network effects in
facilitating a company like Microsoft to develop new knowledge-based
products (involving high upfront costs and supra-competitive revenues)
without patent protection.137 Their article argues that antitrust rules
should bend in cases like Microsoft in order to facilitate the development
of new technology where patent protection is unavailable. 13
8
The principal antitrust rules that Evans and Schmalensee saw as in
need of modification for knowledge-based industries were those
131. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 707-09; see Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115,
at 9, 13 (discussing how new-economy industries have few large firms with the bulk of sales as a
result of network effects).
132. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 9-10 (noting that in order to overcome
Microsoft's lead, rival products would have to be a major innovation in that same network).
133. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 708; see also Microsoft Corp. 1H, 253 F.3d 34, 53
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (providing additional background on how software developers might use APIs to
write their own applications).
134. See United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Corp. 1), 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22, 24 (D.D.C.
1999) (detailing IBM's "attempt to reverse-engineer, or 'clone,' part of the Windows API set");
Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 708 (noting that due to "the costly prospect of reverse
engineering" IBM abandoned the field to Microsoft).
135. See Microsoft Corp. 1, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 22, 24; Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 708.
136. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 12-13.
137. See id. at 9-13 (discussing in greater detail network effects, competitive innovation, and
the process of achieving profits in high-risk technology industries).
138. See id. at 2, 13-14, 22, 33 (discussing the challenges posed by current antitrust rules).
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governing tying arrangements and predatory pricing. 139 Evans and
Schmalensee viewed tying as a concern because they saw software
development in the computer industry largely taking the path of one kind
of program incorporating functions already being performed by another
program. 140 This would be especially likely for operating systems. This
developmental path would increase the efficiencies of the operating
system, as the users would have a growing range of functions at their
fingertips, but that path could be described in antitrust language as
involving a series of technological ties. Under the law as it was at the
time Evans and Schmalensee wrote their article, technological ties
imposed by a firm with market power would be per se illegal. 14' The
ruling by the D.C. Circuit in the Microsoft Corp. II antitrust case to
create an exception to the otherwise applicable per se rule for platform
software has largely solved this problem. 42 Evans and Schmalensee
were also concerned that the antitrust rules governing predatory pricing
would impede the development of firms like Microsoft. 43 They feared
that the courts would take the offering of applications or middleware
without charge as sales below cost for purpose of predatory pricing
analysis. 44 This fear has turned out to be unfounded, as the courts
rejected that contention in the Microsoft Corp. 11 antitrust case. 145
Although antitrust developments can be seen as accommodating
Microsoft's development path, the larger issue raised by Evans and
Schmalensee is whether knowledge-based industries in general
contribute so much to technical advancement that in other cases the
antitrust, intellectual property, or other laws should bend to their needs.
Because the innovation model used by Evans and Schmalensee was
based on the pharmaceutical industry, it incorporated the patent system
and its requirements, such as non-obviousness. 46 In extending their
patent-like innovation model to Microsoft, they embraced a different
kind of innovation-innovation that could not meet the patent system's
non-obviousness requirement. 47 This extension, however, worked in
that particular case because Microsoft was the beneficiary of strong
139. See generally id. (describing the need for modification with regards to predation and tying
law).
140. See id. at 30-31.
141. Id. at 15.
142. Microsoft Corp. 11, 253 F.3d 34, 84-85, 89-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
143. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 21-22.
144. See id. at 26-28.
145. See Microsoft Corp. II, 253 F.3d at 68.
146. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); see also Evans & Schmalensee, supra note
115, at 3, 5, 8, 10.
147. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 709.
[Vol. 40:437
DOMINANCE, INNOVATION, AND EFFICIENCY
network effects. 148 Further extension of their innovation model may not
be warranted. Knowledge-based industries that are neither protected by
patent law nor receive the benefit of network effects are unable to follow
the development path of the pharmaceutical industry: they cannot cover
their development costs by generating supra-competitive profits. 149 This
result seems consistent with the economic policies that Congress has
built into the patent law-only a technological advance that is beyond
the capabilities of ordinary professionals in the field warrant the
exclusive rights accorded by the patent law.
50
IV. THE WILLIAMSON TRADEOFF
A. The Antitrust Controversy
In a landmark article in 1968, Oliver Williamson proposed that
evaluating mergers from an antitrust perspective would allow the
government and the courts to take into account not only the increased
market power produced by the merger, but any efficiencies generated by
the merger as well. 15 Increased market power would produce a restraint
on output, which would be reflected in a misallocation of resources
(earlier referred to in this Article as a deadweight loss). 152 Williamson
proposed that, as a matter of antitrust analysis, this deadweight loss be
deemed to be offset by the merger-generated efficiencies. 153 The result
would show the impact of the merger on aggregate social welfare. 1
54
Ten years later Robert Bork wrote The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy
at War with Itself, one of the books widely recognized as symbolizing
the so-called "antitrust revolution."' 155 During the late 1970s, the antitrust
literature was the setting for a vigorous debate on the role of efficiency
in the administration and interpretation of the antitrust laws. 156 In his
book, Robert Bork argued forcefully on behalf of the position that
148. See id. at 710; Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 115, at 9.
149. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 701-02, 706-07.
150. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 115, at 701, 709.
151. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 18-19, 23-24, 26, 29, 33-34 (1968) [hereinafter The Welfare
Tradeoffs]. See also Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM.
ECON. REV. 105, 105-07, 110 (1969) (discussing the approaches to allocative efficiency, including
the balance between market power and economic efficiencies); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as
an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 701, 703-05 (1977) (raising Williamson's
previous discussion on the balance of efficiency and economy, and the operationality of this model).
152. See The Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 151, at 21-22, 21 fig. I.
153. See id. at 22 n.4.
154. See id. at 22-23.
155. See generally BORK, supra note 2.
156. See id. at 70.
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antitrust should be grounded solely on the furtherance of efficiency.15 7
He argued that recognition of efficiency as the single goal of the antitrust
laws would provide them with needed coherence, increased
predictability for the business community, and would supply decisional
standards for judges applying them, constraining their discretion.,5
Unfortunately, however, Bork cast the argument of his book in
language that was inappropriate to his analysis and its goals. He defined
efficiency and aggregate welfare as the furtherance of "consumer
welfare," justifying this usage on the ground that everyone (including a
producer) is a consumer. 59 Thus in Bork's usage, the furtherance of
consumer welfare means the furtherance of aggregate welfare. 160 But his
phrasing was prone to misunderstanding.'
6 1
In the usage of economists, "efficiency" connotes the deployment
of resources in a way that furthers aggregate welfare. 162 Economists do
not generally use the phrase "consumer welfare"; in their usage, welfare
normally means the total welfare of society without taking account of
distributional effects. 163  In performing microeconomic analysis,
however, economists do distinguish between consumer surplus, producer
surplus, and total surplus. 164 Consumer surplus is the difference between
buyers' reservation prices and market price (that is, the difference
between the value of a purchased product to the buyer and the generally
lower price that the buyer pays). 165 Producer surplus is the seller's
profit. 166 And total surplus is the combination of consumer and producer
surplus. 167 The total surplus is the amount that the transaction contributes
to the furtherance of the general or aggregate welfare of society. 1
68
It is an easy step from assessing how a given transaction furthers
consumer surplus to equating the transaction's effect on consumer
surplus with its contribution towards consumer welfare. This is a concept
157. See id. at 28.
158. Id. at69-72.
159. See id. at 109-10. Bork makes it clear that "consumer welfare" in his usage is equivalent
to aggregate welfare where he states that the owners of a newly created monopoly "are also
consumers" so that the higher prices buyers pay for the product merely causes "a shift in income
between two classes of consumers." Id. at 110.
160. See id.; Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 347 &
n.28 (2010).
161. See id.
162. See BORK, supra note 2, at 7-8, 107-11.
163. See Ariel Ezrachi, Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European
Enforcement Standard, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 47, 63 n.81 (2012).
164. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 22, at 288-89, 289 fig.9. 1.
165. Id. at 123, 288.
166. See id. at 289 & fig.9.1.
167. See id. at 288-89, 289 fig.9.1.
168. See id. at 289, 294.
460 HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 40:437
DOMINANCE, INNOVATION, AND EFFICIENCY
that, as noted, plays no role in standard economic analysis but that was
popularized by Bork. Such a step would be based on the analogy of the
contribution of a transaction's total surplus to aggregate welfare. Bork's
choice of language is prone to this misinterpretation. Shortly after the
appearance of Bork's The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself,
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for the Court in Reitner v.
Sonotone Corp.,169 embraced Bork's language, referring to the antitrust
laws as a "consumer welfare prescription," referencing that book's
discussion of the phrase. 7 ° Thus, Chief Justice Burger both adopted
Bork's language and Bork's understanding of consumer welfare as
equivalent to aggregate welfare. 17 Almost all of the subsequent judicial
equations of consumer welfare with the purpose of the antitrust laws are
traceable, directly or indirectly, to Chief Justice Burger's Sonotone Corp.
opinion.1 72 Thus, the ambiguity of Bork's language affected judicial
discourse.
Within five years of the publication of Bork's The Antitrust
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, Robert Lande, challenging its
contention that the antitrust laws should be grounded on efficiency,
argued that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws should be the
prevention of wealth transfers from consumers to producers.173 Lande's
proposal was to use the antitrust laws to prohibit any reduction of
consumer surplus. 174 This would make any transaction resulting in a
price increase an antitrust violation. 175 Under Lande's proposal, there
would be no room for the Williamson tradeoff.
176
169. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
170. Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. See id.
172. E.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984); Arizona
v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 367 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). See Gifford, supra
note 95, at 1700-01.
173. See generally Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
174. See id. at 76, 142, 144-45, 145 nn.296-97.
175. Seeid. at 146&n.300-01.
176. See id. at 75-76, 146-47; see infra fig.3.
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Williamson and Bork contend that the overall impact of a
transaction from an antitrust perspective is the combination of the
two shaded areas: the area Al (deadweight loss) reduces social
welfare, while the area A2 (cost savings) increases social welfare. If
the cost savings exceed the deadweight loss, then the transaction
increases social welfare.
Lande, of course, understood that Bork had used the consumer
welfare phrase as equivalent to aggregate welfare. Indeed, the very title
of his 1982 article reveals the conflict between his proposal and the
efficiency concept that underlied the antitrust revolution of the preceding
decade. 17 7 Nonetheless, Lande's proposal to safeguard consumer surplus
was easily translatable into the language of maximizing consumer
welfare. Now that the courts had accepted the antitrust laws as a
consumer welfare prescription, the likelihood increased that consumer
welfare as used by Bork and Chief Justice Burger would be confused
with Lande's proposal of safeguarding consumer surplus. That confusion
ensued and by the turn of the new century, many courts began to equate
the purposes of the antitrust laws as both the fostering of efficiency and
the maximizing of consumer welfare, but were attributing the Landean
(non-Borkian) meaning to the latter term. 178 This became evident
through the growing judicial insistence that merger-generated
efficiencies be "passed on" to consumers and the judiciary's
disinclination to consider offsetting efficiencies in evaluating mergers
generating increased levels of concentration. 179  The Landeaninterpretation of consumer welfare appears to have been accepted by the
177. Seeid. at65.
178. Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrie, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards of the
United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 432-33, 446-48 (2004).
179. Seeid. at447-48.
[Vol. 40:437
DOMINANCE, INNOVA TION, AND EFFICIENCY
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") (collectively the "Enforcement Agencies") which have
incorporated it into their Merger Guidelines (the "Guidelines"). 80
This controversy over the role of efficiency in the application of the
antitrust laws and the role (and interpretation) of consumer welfare raise
fundamental questions about how far should society's interest in
minimizing the cost of the goods and services it produces give way to
distributional concerns. Does it matter if aggregate welfare is furthered
at the expense of consumer welfare (in the Landean sense)? Can the
courts continue to maintain that the antitrust laws are grounded in the
pursuit of efficiency while they subordinate efficiency to the quite
different goal of maximizing consumer welfare? While the ultimate
answers to these questions remain unresolved, it appears that the
Landean approach has made significant headway in both the courts and
the enforcement authorities.1 81 This issue is whether society will tolerate
the generation of market power with the concomitant deadweight loss
that accompanies market power as the price of furthering (productive)
efficiency. 82 So described, the issue is analogous to the patent tradeoff:
the patent system accepts a deadweight loss as the price for
technological advance, which equates with an increase in dynamic
efficiency.183 The Williamson tradeoff accepts a deadweight loss as the
price for greater static efficiency. 1
84
B. Resolving the Issue with a Tax
Economists evaluating the desirability of a public expenditure (say,
building a bridge) assess the impact of the expenditure on aggregate
welfare. Their assessment is made without regard to distributional
concerns. 85 Distributional concerns are dealt with through mechanisms
that are better designed to this task, such as the income tax. t86 This
180. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 9.3-10, at 29-30 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf (describing entry sufficient to counteract
the anticompetitive effects of a merger as rendering a price increase by a merged firm unprofitable
and cognizable efficiencies as preventing price increases and the importance of passing through
efficiencies to customers).
181. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
182. See David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 787, 855-58 (1989).
183. See Gifford, supra note 6, at 82.
184. See The Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 151, at 21-23, 21 fig.l, 22 n.4, 25.
185. See Robin Boadway & Maurice Marchand, The Use of Public Expenditures for
Redistributive Purposes, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 45, 45-46 (1995) (noting that an economic
analysis of redistribution purposes is unnecessary for public expenditures); Ken Heyer, Welfare
Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2006, at
29, 41.
186. See Heyer, supra note 185, at 50.
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approach has been followed since the 1930s where it was pioneered by
J. R. Hicks and Nicholas Kaldor. 87 Thus, on the Williamson tradeoff
issue, the mainstream economics approach would be to allow an
efficiency-generating merger and to rely on the income tax to correct for
distributional inequities produced by any increased market power of the
merged company.
The issue arises, however, because the Enforcement Agencies
appear to have abandoned the pure efficiency goals of antitrust in favor
of the Landean-endorsed policy of barring wealth transfers from
producers to consumers. 188 They thus are construing the case law-and
in particular, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Sonotone Corp.-as
basing antitrust policy on the furtherance of "consumer welfare" as
narrowly understood (meaning the welfare of just consumers, qua
consumers), despite Chief Justice Burger's citation of Bork's The
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, where Bork had defined
consumer welfare as aggregate social welfare on the rationale that all
people (including producers) are consumers.189
In the case of a merger that produces both increased market power
and offsetting efficiencies, the current policy of the Enforcement
Agencies is to oppose the merger if the increased market power is likely
to produce a price increase.1 90 Their objection (following Lande) is to the
price increase.' 9' In the case of such a merger (Federal Trade
Commission v. HJ Heinz Co. 192 is a good example) it is no defense that
the resource misallocation is compensated for by production
efficiencies. 93 Yet, even on the narrow version of the consumer welfare
approach, the Enforcement Agencies are over-enforcing by barring the
merger entirely, depriving society of the merger's contribution to
welfare. At least in theory, the Enforcement Agencies should be satisfied
as long as the merger was permitted subject to the constraint that the
merged firm would not raise prices over the pre-merger level. Such a
187. J. R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 712 (1939);
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49
ECON. J. 549, 550-51, 551 n.1 (1939).
188. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 9.3-10, at 29-31 (2010); supra notes 178-80
and accompanying text.
189. See Reitner v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); BORK, supra note 2, at 110;
supra notes 159-61, 169-80 and accompanying text.
190. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10, at 30-31, 30 n. 14.
191. See id. § 10, at 30-31, 31 n. 15 ("[T]he Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies
likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm customers in the relevant market,
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market." (footnote omitted)).
192. 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
193. Id. at 720-21 (requiring that there be significant proof of extraordinary efficiencies that are
"merger-specific"); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10, at 31 ("Efficiencies almost never
justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.").
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merger would contribute to aggregate welfare without transferring
wealth from consumers to producers, thus satisfying the Landean
approach to antitrust. 1
94
Consider a carefully designed tax as an answer to this problem. The
tax is equal to the difference between the pre-merger price and the post-
merger price. 195 As applied to the Williamson/Bork model, the merged
company would have an incentive to avoid the tax so far as possible, and
thus to drop its price to the pre-merger level and to expand its output to
the pre-merger level. But the merged firm would keep the benefit of the
merger-induced efficiencies, thus preserving the incentives to merge
when efficiencies would result.
Over time, economic conditions are bound to change. Perhaps the
tax should be equal to the difference between the merger firm's price and
the pre-merger price or the difference between the merged firm's price
and its marginal cost-whichever is less. In a practical version of this
proposal, average variable cost would be an acceptable substitute for
marginal cost. This would properly reduce the burden on the merged
firm should its costs rise in the future. Under this revised formulation the
tax would never impose a loss on the merged firm. Rather, the firm
would be pressured to price at the pre-merger level, except when its
marginal cost rose above that level, when it would be pressed to price at
a competitive level.
Merger-induced efficiencies fall into two broad categories: a
reduction in variable cost and a reduction in fixed cost. 96 The
Guidelines suggest that the latter is less likely to be approved because a
reduction in fixed cost is unlikely to affect the merged firm's pricing.197
So a merger that increases market concentration is likely to restrict
output and to raise price, and a fixed-cost savings is unlikely to offset
194. See Lande, supra note 173, at 71, 75-77, 142, 150.
195. The tax is equivalent to a court order barring the merged company from raising its price,
but it has two advantages over a court order. First, the tax has an inherent flexibility. See Heyer,
supra note 185, at 50. As pointed out in the text, the tax adjusts to changes in economic conditions,
so that when the firm's costs rise sufficiently, the tax adjusts so that it never imposes a loss on the
firm. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 22, at 280-81, 281 fig.8.18. Second, courts are
extremely reluctant to supervise prices, as they lack the time, resources, and competence to do so.
See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927). The tax can be
designed in a way that the firm self-reports to the enforcement authorities its prices, the prices
before the merger, and the difference. This information is not complex and is readily available to the
firm. Normally, the difference will be zero and no tax will in fact be imposed. A court would
intervene only when the enforcement authorities contended that the firm misreported. Since the
information required is straightforward, the burden imposed on the court would likely be minimal.
196. See Heyer, supra note 185, at 35-37,35 n. 14.
197. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 2.2.1, 10, at 4 & n.3, 31 & n.15; Heyer, supra
note 185, at 36-37, 36 n. 17; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 22, at 209.
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these effects.'98 A reduction in variable cost, however, necessarily
reflects a reduction in marginal cost; and it is marginal cost that
determines a firm's price and output decisions. 199 For this reason, the
Guidelines are more open to efficiencies that reduce variable (or
marginal) cost,200 although even here the efficiencies have to be
sufficiently great such that the merged firm would lack an incentive to
raise prices.2 ' As the foregoing discussion makes evident, however, the
proposed tax would render these Guideline approaches obsolete. It
would make the distinction between variable cost and fixed cost
reductions unimportant for merger enforcement and ensure that society
received the benefits of all merger-generated cost reductions.
Finally, it is necessary to say a word about nomenclature and
mechanics. The proposed monetary penalty on the kind of mergers to
which the Williamson tradeoff analysis applies does not have to be
called a tax nor does it have to be a tax-in-fact. The most straightforward
implementation of the proposal would be for Congress to enact a tax, as
described above. But it is also possible for the Enforcement Agencies to
bargain (on behalf of the public) with the merging companies. 2°2 Indeed,
it is standard procedure for the Enforcement Agencies to withhold their
approval of a proposed merger until the parties agree to spin off certain
assets.2°3 In such cases, the antitrust evaluation of the merger changes
when the assets in question are no longer part of the merged company.
204
So here, when the merged company's incentives are so changed that it is
in its interest to expand output to the competitive (or to the pre-merger)
level, then the antitrust evaluation of the merger would change. Were the
Enforcement Agencies to bargain for a penalty structured in the way
described above, that could be understood as insurance that the merged
company would not act anti-competitively. Indeed, under the current
198. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 1,2.1.3, 10, at 2-3, 31.
199. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 22, at 208-09.
200. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10, at 30-31, 30 n.14. Here the Guidelines refer
to "efficiencies resulting from shifting production among facilities formerly owned separately";
these efficiencies would involve variable costs. Id. § 10, at 31. The Guidelines expressed concern
that the efficiencies prevent price increases also necessarily involving variable costs. See id.
201. See id. § 10, at 30-31, 31 n.15. Federal Trade Commission v. HJ Heinz Co. is an
example of a proposed merger that would have produced operating efficiencies, but which was still
blocked because the court did not believe the efficiencies were sufficiently great. See 246 F.3d 708,
721-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court also thought that the merger would enhance the likelihood of
tacit co-operation between the merged company and its one major rival. See id at 724-25. Had the
proposed tax been available, the merger could have gone through with no unilateral effects danger
and no threat of oligopolistic coordination.
202. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1, at 1 (noting that the Enforcement Agencies
"seek to identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers").
203. See id. §§ 7, 9, at 24-25, 28.
204. See id. §§ 9, 9.2, 11, at 28-29, 32.
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practice of evaluating mergers under a wealth-transfer standard, in the
absence of the merger partners accepting the penalty, the merger would
be disapproved, despite its contribution (through merger-generated
efficiencies) to aggregate welfare. At least in theory, all of the parties
(the merger partners and the Enforcement Agencies) would benefit from
the merger partners accepting the penalty. The merger partners would be
able to consummate the merger and to capture the benefits of merger-
generated efficiencies. The Enforcement Agencies would bring about an
expansion of efficiency with no adverse effect on "consumer" welfare.
V. BEYOND THE PATENT SYSTEM
The genius of the patent system as an engine of innovation is its
combination of the patent law's specially created rights of exclusivity
with economic incentives generated by the market. The theory
underlying the patent system is that the exclusive rights provided by the
patent system provide an inventor with the stimulus to invest time and
resources in inventive activity.-°5 But the inventor's reward depends on
the market's demand for his product.2 6
Inventive activity thus is guided by the collective knowledge
inhering in the market and is directed towards those inventions on which
society places the highest value.0 7 Inventive activity for which demand
is lacking goes unrewarded, regardless of the inventor's creativity. The
market's ability to collect and synthesize information is generally
superior to all other systems.0 8 Its information sources include all
persons staking their own money on their estimates of value and its
synthesizing abilities arise from the collective inputs of the
participants. 209 No person or group or institution can muster equivalent
resources.
Yet, despite the market's advantages, it has its weaknesses;
weaknesses that (because of the patent system's incorporation of the
market) affect the patent system. These weaknesses involve the capacity
of the market to identify social needs.210 In general, and for the reasons
already set forth, the market does a superb job on this score. But there
are social values that the market fails to reflect because these values are
not currently reflected in costs and prices of products and services
(externalities, including collective-action problems), or because many of
the would-be consumers of the relevant products and services lack the
205. See Gifford, supra note 6, at 83-84.
206. Id. at 81-84.
207. See id. at 83-84.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 82.
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resources to buy them and so their needs also are not reflected in market
outcomes.211 Similarly, the market fails to register pharmaceutical
products that provide benefits to those afflicted by rare medical
conditions.21 2 Because of the quantitative smallness of the need, the
market largely ignores it, despite the fact that society understands that
need to be qualitatively significant.21 3
The patent system, incorporating the market as it does, produces
non-optimum results in these cases where the market fails or otherwise
generates outcomes that do not correspond with social welfare.
Moreover, because the patent system operates in part by generating an
overlay of intellectual property rights that adhere to physical property,
global commerce in patented products are subject to World Trade
Organization ("WTO") free trade rules that, inter alia, have the effect of
protecting discriminating sellers from arbitrage transactions.21 4 And it is
the prospect of arbitrage that inhibits the pharmaceutical manufacturers
from engaging in the price discrimination that would make
pharmaceuticals more available to the lower-income populations of
developing and under-developed countries. 2 1 These shortcomings of the
patent system particularly affect the pharmaceutical industry. The
question thus arises as to whether there are alternative means for
generating the innovation that society requires which are superior to the
patent system for any identifiable class of products--especially for any
identifiable subset of pharmaceuticals.
There is such a class. It consists of pharmaceutical products for the
treatment of well-known diseases for which there is no known cure.216
Two decades ago products that could treat HIV/AIDS fell into such a
class.217 Currently, treatments for most forms of cancers fall into that
class. Also, there is no known cure for Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever (Ebola
HF)/Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), and pharmaceuticals that could do this
are needed. 21 8 But there may be no attractive market for such a drug,
211. See id.
212. Id. at 82, 86-87.
213. See id. at 86-87, 213.
214. See id. at 81, 116-17.
215. See id at 115-17. "Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
incorporated into the WTO Agreement prohibits any party to the Agreement from imposing
quantitative restrictions on imports or exports." Id. at 117. A literal reading of Article XI of the
GATT thus would bar governments from interfering with arbitrage that is a major deterrent to
international price discrimination by pharmaceutical manufacturers. Id. at 117-18. However, there
are a number of avenues for avoiding arbitrage despite the terms of Article XI of the GATT. See id
at 116-24 (discussing the WTO issues as well as the global financing proposal).
216. Seeid.at 118-19.
217. See id.
218. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
EBOLA HEMORRHAGIC FEVER INFORMATION PACKET 2 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
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because most of the affected population is poor and would not be able to
pay the 2rices that would provide the needed stimulus under the patent
system.
Where the need is widely recognized, society has no need for the
unique capabilities of the patent system to collect and synthesize
information. But the patent system also directs the funding of
research. 220 Are there superior alternatives to the patent system for
funding pharmaceutical research? Of course, government could fund
such research, but government would be prone to distortion through
lobbying and possibly even corruption. But if we limited government
funding to drugs targeting a small number of identified illnesses whose
cure or treatment are widely recognized public needs, then we would
have minimized the danger.
An advantage of public funding is that the resulting
pharmaceuticals would be produced at marginal cost.2 21 And output
would not be restricted as the patent system contemplates.2 22 Of course,
the public would pay the cost of the research through taxes, but the
resulting product would be freely available, both in the United States and
abroad. Not only would the domestic market be free from the
deadweight loss generated by the patent system, but the impact of the
WTO agreements on the incentives of the patentees to engage in price
discrimination with the accompanying problems of arbitrage would no
longer be relevant issues.
These considerations lead to a further issue connected with
financing. Currently the American public pays for most of the world's
223pharmaceutical research, through taxes and high drug prices.
Pharmaceutical prices in other nations are often regulated or otherwise
224depressed through government action. Because the benefits of
pharmaceutical research are worldwide, ideally the financing properly
should be worldwide as well. Recognition of the world's different
income levels might suggest that nations contribute to pharmaceutical
research through a formula based on each nation's gross domestic
product.
Let's take a global welfare approach to this issue. Disease knows no
national boundaries. The development of products by the pharmaceutical
ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/Fact Sheets/EbolaFactBooklet.pdf (stating that there is no
standard treatment for the Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever).
219. See Kristina M. Lybecker & Robert A. Freeman, Funding Pharmaceutical Innovation
Through Direct Tax Credits, 2 HEALTH ECON. POL'Y & L. 267, 275-77 (2007).
220. See Gifford, supra note 6, at 81.
221. See Lybecker & Freeman, supra note 219, at 270-71.
222. See id. at 271.
223. Gifford, supra note 6, at 124.
224. Id. at 115.
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industry is a costly process. 225 The potential beneficiaries of this
development are everywhere. The suggestion of this Article is that, for a
limited range of pharmaceuticals, the nations of the world adopt a system
of new product development and distribution different from the current
one based on the patent system. Under the alternative model,
pharmaceutical research for a carefully limited selection of potential
drugs would be commissioned by an international organization. The
necessary funds would come from the world's governments. Because
nations vary widely in their wealth and income, 2 6 the world's
governments should contribute the necessary amounts according to a
formula based on gross domestic product. Further adjustment might be
made on a progressive income tax model, with higher-income nations
paying a higher percentage of their gross domestic product than nations
with lower gross domestic product. In this way, the drugs that the world
needs would be produced and made universally available at their
production cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has identified four areas where changes in the law or
legal arrangements could improve welfare or (in the case of dynamically
competitive industries) have already improved welfare. Sadly, most of
the changes proposed here are unlikely to take place. The changes
proposed for Section 271 are unlikely because congressional action on
such a technical matter is difficult, and the issues are complex, impeding
public understanding. Similarly, the tax on mergers that are prima facie
problematic from an antitrust standpoint would be unlikely to command
congressional support. Despite the fact that such a tax would ease merger
approvals, many would likely see it as undue government intervention in
the economy. Moreover, although the tax would not in fact be collected
(since its purpose would be to create behavioral incentives), many in
Congress that are philosophically opposed to any new taxes would object
as a matter of principle. The issues, again, are complex and not
conducive to public debate. The proposal for an alternative funding of
certain pharmaceutical products probably is even more unlikely to be
adopted, since it calls for action not only by the U.S. government, but by
the other governments of the world. So its adoption would be impeded
by immense forces of governmental inertia.
By contrast, the change in antitrust law that appears to accord with
the needs of so-called dynamically competitive industries worked
225. See Lybecker & Freeman, supra note 219, at 268.
226. See id. at 280; GDP (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
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because it was the result of judicial decision-making. The courts are
accustomed to technical issues and their insulation from politics and
political institutions enables them to deal with complex issues
analytically on their merits.

